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Wages and Employment Growth:  





We address the effects of wages on employment growth on 
the basis of a theoretical model from which cost and de-
mand effects can be derived. In the empirical analysis we 
take a highly disaggregated perspective and apply a newly 
developed shift-share regression technique on an exhaus-
tive and very accurate data set for West Germany. The re-
gression shows that the impact of regional wages on em-
ployment growth is significantly negative. There is some 
variation of this effect across sectors, but in no case we find 
support for the claim that an exogenous wage increase 
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1) Introduction 
The connection between wages and employment growth is among the most fundamental macro-
economic relations. Most economists agree that higher labour costs tend to reduce the employ-
ment growth rate of an economy. An increase in the relative factor price of labour will ceteris 
paribus cause a substitution of input factors and make production more capital intensive. Or, in 
the context of globalization, higher domestic labour costs will favour a shift of production to-
wards low wage countries. It is therefore argued that an appropriate way to increase employment 
growth and – inter alia – to fight the seminal problem of unemployment is a policy of wage mod-
eration. A rule of thumb says that wages can rise at most by the rate of productivity growth plus 
the inflation rate without having adverse employment effects, and positive employment growth 
must be “bought” by keeping the growth rate of wages below this benchmark level (Sachver-
staendigenrat, 2004; Lehment, 2000). 
Yet, even a brief look at commonly repeated public discussions or at the arguments of trade un-
ions prior to wage negotiations makes clear that there is by far no general consensus in the soci-
ety about the employment effects of wage increases (Jerger/Landmann, 2002). After all, wages 
are not only a cost factor for firms, but also account for roughly 2/3 of national income and are 
thus a major determinant of aggregate demand. In view of this, a “purchasing power argument” 
(henceforth: PPA) remains vital according to which higher wages can actually increase the em-
ployment growth rate due to demand side effects. Versions of the PPA have a long tradition in 
the history of economic thought and refer to ideas developed by Keynes (1936) (though there is 
no direct counterpart in his work). But in modern macroeconomic theory, the PPA practically 
plays no role any longer. This neglect stands in some contrast to the unchanged political rele-
vance of the argument.  
The model by Jerger/Michaelis (2003) is among the rare exceptions where the demand side re-
percussions of a wage hike are explicitly taken into account via a Kaldorian structure of savings 
of entrepreneur and worker households. They show that a wage hike increases aggregate demand 
if the two population groups have different marginal propensities to save. Whether this demand 
effect only moderates or over-compensates the negative supply side effect depends on the ad-
justment processes and the time horizon in the economy. In line with the conventional wisdom, 
Jerger/Michaelis (2003) point out that it is highly unlikely, with plausible values of deep exoge-
nous parameters like the scale elasticity of production, the cyclicality of the price mark-up, or the 
degree of price stickiness, that the demand side dominates. This agrees with the conclusion of   4
Appelbaum/Schettkat (1999), where the prevalence of the PPA hinges on the price and income 
elasticity of demand on the respective product markets. However, from a theoretical point of 
view, it might be unlikely that the PPA holds, but it can not be ruled out with certainty. 
Ultimately the employment growth effect of a wage increase is therefore an empirical question, 
and this paper intends to contribute to the empirical knowledge about this issue. What distin-
guishes our approach from existing work in this area (see e.g. Peturson/Sloek, 2001; Blanch-
ard/Wolfers, 2000) is that we look at the connection between wages and employment growth 
from a highly disaggregated and intra-national perspective. Typically, employment growth per-
formances are contrasted on the level of different countries (e.g. Garibaldi/Mauro, 2002). This is 
obviously an important thing to do, but macroeconomic studies at the national level also have 
some drawbacks. Firstly, they are naturally restricted to a quite low number of observations. Sec-
ondly, for an analysis involving wages, the national perspective might be too unspecific, as na-
tional average values hide great wage differences and thus a lot of statistical variation within a 
country. And lastly, economists have become increasingly aware in recent years that the intra-
national variation in employment growth is often at least as pronounced as between countries 
(Martin/Tyler, 2000; Decressin/Fatas, 1995; Blanchard/Katz, 1992). This is also the case for 
Germany, which together with Italy is often referred to as the classical example of an economy 
with extreme internal disparities.
1   
In this study we focus our attention on employment growth within West Germany. We distin-
guish 28 different industries and 326 West German districts and look at the time period from 
1993 to 2001. That is, our unit of observation is an industry within a region. In order to analyse 
the trade-off between the cost push and the demand side effects of high wages, we examine how 
an exogenous regional wage increase affects the employment growth of the sectors in that loca-
tion. A regional wage increase implies an increase in labour costs for each sector in that district, 
which has negative effects on employment growth. But potentially there is a mitigating positive 
                                                 
1Of course this is mainly due to the large East-West gap that keeps on existing even after more than a decade since 
re-unification. In this paper, however, we do not look at the difference between East and West Germany, but focus 
on the internal disparities within the West. In doing so, we focus on a well integrated economic area without any 
significant formal obstacles to goods trade or factor mobility, and – very importantly – with a common economic 
history over the last decades. A comparison of East versus West Germany would probably not reveal general insights 
about the determinants of regional disparities in employment growth, but rather historically special circumstances, 
undigested parts of the transformation process and the “reunification shock”.   5
effect due to an increased purchasing power of local consumers.
2 We explore this question with a 
new econometric estimation approach, a shift-share-regression that builds on the deterministic 
precursor developed by Dunn (1960) and the regression analytical analogue pioneered by Patter-
son (1991).
3 This technique allows us to disentangle the anatomy of employment growth in West 
Germany and control for general industry specific, location specific and time specific develop-
ments, as well as for a variety of additional variables that influence the growth performance of a 
sector/region-unit, in order to isolate the partial effect of wages on employment growth. 
But wages are not included directly in the regression, because it would be quite misleading to use 
the raw and unsettled averages as explanatory variables. Labour productivity systematically dif-
fers across locations and industries, which gives rise to wage disparities across the single units. 
We are interested though in the employment growth effects of “excessive“ wages that are not 
backed up by the underlying characteristics of the workforces. To construct such a measure, we 
take a preceding step and examine the wage structure across West Germany. We regress the av-
erage daily income in each sector and region on a variety of explanatory factors like the qualifica-
tion, age and gender structure of the respective workforce that determine labour productivity and 
control for other factors that influence the level of wages. From this analysis we take the regional 
fixed effects and include them in the shift-share regression on employment growth. That is, a 
“high wage region” in our interpretation is not a region with high wages per se, but a region 
whose wages are higher than expected, given a variety of characteristics. If the PPA actually 
holds, we should see positive employment growth effects associated with this wage measure, 
since the demand side effects of overly high regional wages should over-compensate the cost 
push effects.  
First we address this question without differentiating across sectors. But we are also interested to 
see if there is a sectoral variation, i.e. if the PPA is stronger visible in some industries than in 
others. A frequently raised argument against the PPA is that the cost push effect of a wage hike 
                                                 
2  We look at a regional wage increase rather than at an increase accruing only to a single sector within a region, 
because the demand side repercussions of such a wage hike only for the own local sector are supposedly very small 
and negligible. 
3The deterministic shift-share method by Dunn (1960) splits up the annual employment growth rate in the basic units 
of observation into a general national (or business cycle) component, an industry component and a genuinely re-
gional effect. This method has often been criticised, since it prevents standard hypothesis testing and produces biased 
results that typically overstate the regional effects (Armstrong/Taylor, 2000; Knudsen/Barff, 1991). This critique 
does not apply, however, to the regression analytical analogue with complete sets of sector, region and time dummies 
that has recently facilitated some very useful contributions (see e.g. Moeller/Tassinopoulos, 2000; Blien/Wolf, 
2002).    6
accrues locally, but the induced increase in purchasing power drains out (at least partly) to other 
countries or, respectively, regions. One might thus expect that a regional wage increase is less 
harmful for sectors that have a strong focus on local markets and that serve mainly local consum-
ers, as these industries benefit directly from an increase in private spending.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give details about our data set and 
present a brief descriptive overview about internal economic disparities in West Germany. Sec-
tion 3 provides some theoretical background. The estimation approach is introduced in section 4. 
In section 5 we present the results for the preceding wage structure analysis and in section 6 the 
results of the shift-share regression on employment growth. Section 7 summarizes the results and 
provides some concluding remarks. 
  
2) Data and a descriptive overview 
The data for this study is provided by the German Federal Employment Services (Bundesagentur 
fuer Arbeit) and contains the complete population of all full time employment relationships that 
are subject to social security, i.e. excluding civil servants and self-employed individuals. Since 
individual social security contributions are calculated on the basis of this official information, the 
data is highly reliable and by far more accurate than survey data. We focus here only on full time 
employment, because there are some data problems for part-time employment relationships due 
to the change in the data basis in 04/99, and because the wages for part-time employees are 
measured less accurately.
4 For each individual a new record is stored for each year up to 31 De-
cember and for every change of firm. We use here the so-called quarterly statistics, which in-
clude cross-sections for 30 June each year.  
The data is partitioned according to the 326 West German districts (NUTS III regions, 
“Landkreise” and “kreisfreie Staedte”, excluding West Berlin)
5 and according to 28 different in-
dustries. We have yearly observations for the period from 1993 to 2001. Theoretically, we could 
therefore observe  
  9 years * 326 districts * 28 industries = 82152 cells 
 
                                                 
4 The data for part-time employees does not provide the exact figure of hours worked. 
 
5 For West Germany there is fortunately no problem with redefinitions of territorial units in the observation period, 
with the district of Hannover being the only exception. A comparable study for East German districts has to solve 
great difficulties to take into account various territorial reforms (see Blien et. al., 2003) 
   7
De facto our data set entails 70296 region/sector/time period-cells, because some of the possible 
combinations of dimensions do not occur at all (e.g. coalmining in northern Germany), because 
we have excluded all sector/region combinations which were not constantly active with at least 
one officially reported employee in all years of the observation period,
6 and since we take the 
employment growth rate as the dependent variable which gives us one year less of observations. 
In total our data vector has 8787 district/sector-combinations per year.  
Table 1 gives an impression about the aggregate development in our data set from 1993 to 2001. 
Starting with roughly 17.5 million jobs, full time employment subject to social security has re-
vealed a declining trend over the observation period, with an average annual growth rate of -0.67 
per cent (arithmetic mean). But there was great variation in this development, both across sectors 
and regions. The average annual growth rate on the district level ranges from +2.37% in Outer-
Munich to -3.47% in Gelsenkirchen (Ruhr area).  
 
Table 1: Full time employment in West Germany, 1993-2001 – our data set. 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
17535753 16964123 16781711 16425512 16154737 16169147 16352522 16103478 16600036
 
 
Table 2 shows the 28 different sectors and reports the size and the employment share in 1993 and 
in 2001, as well as the average yearly growth rate. Whereas some sectors like coalmining or tex-
tile/leather have dramatically shrunk, the business oriented service sector has expanded by more 
than 6 per cent per year. From the employment statistics we can obtain the wage income for each 
full time employee in our data set, including all bonus and extra payments subject to social secu-
rity. With this information we can compute the average wage income per calendar day in each 
sector, region and year. These wage incomes will of course be heavily influenced by union wages 
for many employees, as collective bargaining has a high relevance in West Germany (Ko-
haut/Schnabel, 2003). It is known that union wages often show little variation, in particular across 
regions (Buettner, 1999). But our wage data refers to effective earnings which can substantially 
differ from union wages due to a positive wage drift and which reveal a much more substantial 
variation across districts and industries (Suedekum, 2004; Schnabel, 1995). It is an advantage that 
                                                 
6 This procedure, which is necessary to prevent infinite growth rates, only led to an elimination of very few “mini 
sectors”. Even if single industries saw a rapid decline in a district, the number of employees hardly ever had fallen 
down to zero. In total, less than 0.5 per cent of the full time employment relationships were eliminated.    8
the wages per employment relation are reported at the workplace location. Quite often one finds 
spatially disaggregated income data at the core of regional analyses that refer to the residence 
population. For example, the European Commission uses GDP per capita in NUTS2 regions for 
the conduct of European regional policies. This data is problematic, however, since it suffers 
from a bias due to daily commuting. The GDP per capita level in big cities is typically overstated 
as many persons work in the metropolitan business districts, but live in surrounding areas 
(Boldrin/Canova, 2001).  
 
Table 2: Sectoral employment growth in West Germany 
 

















1  Agriculture & Forestry  125667 0.717 154937 0.933  3.27 
2  Utilities & Electric Industry  218745 1.247 170523 1.027  -3.03 
3  Mining  138661  0.791 67461 0.406  -8.45 
4  Chemical Industry  530173 3.023 408811 2.463  -3.18 
5  Synthetic Material  351748 2.006 340339 2.050  -0.37 
6  Nonmetallic Mineral Mining  174260 0.994 138278 0.833  -2.83 
7  Glass & Ceramics  113478  0.647 87817 0.529  -3.13 
8  Primary Metal Manufacturing  676556 3.858 603115 3.633  -1.37 
9  Machinery  858497 4.896 769894 4.638  -1.30 
10  Motor Vehicles  1003808 5.724  953920  5.746  -0.59 
11  Office Supplies, IT, Optics  1398643 7.976 1261019 7.596  -1.25 
12  Musical Instrum., Jewelry, Toys  37164 0.212 26603 0.160  -4.08 
13  Wood-working   359774 2.052 285236 1.718  -2.85 
14  Paper & Printing  336135 1.917 281786 1.698  -2.17 
15  Leather & Apparel  333055 1.899 186604 1.124  -6.95 
16  Food & Tobacco  573604 3.271 465288 2.803  -2.57 
17  Building & Construction  1467588 8.369 1133387 6.828  -3.16 
18  Commerce  2324360 13.255 2186424 13.171  -0.75 
19  Information & Transportation  905406 5.163 930978 5.608  0.38 
20  Finance & Insurance  726519 4.143 696492 4.196  -0.45 
21  Hotels & Gastronomy  407951 2.326 405040 2.440  -0.05 
22  Health Care &  Social Assistance  1241650 7.081 1319586 7.949  0.81 
23  Economy-Related Services  1124991 6.415 1795282  10.815  6.07 
24  Education  391265 2.231 405371 2.442  0.48 
25  Leisure-Related Services  222945 1.271 237840 1.433  0.83 
26  Household-Related Services  144752 0.825 123527 0.744  -1.94 
27  Social Services  337271 1.923 342389 2.063  0.22 
28  Public Sector  1011087 5.766  822089  4.952  -2.46 
 
Our data are not faced with this commuting bias. This might explain why the highest (unsettled) 
average wages per job are not paid in metropolitan areas like Munich or Hamburg, but in the me-  9
dium-sized and heavily specialised districts Wolfsburg, Erlangen and Leverkusen. To get a feel 
for the magnitudes, table 3 reports the “top 10 districts”, as well as the 5 districts at the bottom of 
this hit parade.  
 
 Table 3: Average daily income per full time employment relation, by district (in Euro) 
 
 
  District  Average wage level 
1993-2001 (€) 
1  Wolfsburg, Stadt  92.20 
2  Erlangen, Stadt  91.51 
3  Leverkusen, Stadt  91.16 
4  Frankfurt am Main, Stadt  90.51 
5  München 90.27 
6  Ludwigshafen am Rhein, Stadt  90.16 
7  Böblingen 88.95 
8  Stuttgart 88.90 
9  Main-Taunus-Kreis 88.21 
10  Groß-Gerau 87.60 
322  Passau 62.03 
323  Freyung-Grafenau 61.86 
324  Regen 60.49 
325  Südwestpfalz 60.08 
326  Wittmund 59.64 
 
Looking at raw differences in the sectoral wage structure, one finds the highest values in the en-
ergy sector (on average 98.20 €/day from 1993-2001), the chemical industry (94.84 €) and the 
banking sector (94.79 €), whereas the agricultural sector (54.73 €), gastronomy (43.11 €) and the 
household-related services (37.80 €) have the lowest values. 
With respect to the income data, two further things should be noted. Firstly, income levels that 
exceed the threshold for social security contributions are reported with this value. Our data there-
fore are likely to understate the true degree of wage dispersion in West Germany. Secondly, al-
though we deflate the wages and work with prices of 1993, we are restricted to use a common 
price deflator for all districts (the CPI for West Germany), because price level data and price in-
dices are not available on a regional level. This is unfortunate, because high nominal wages re-
flect –at least partly– a high regional price level (see e.g. Tabuchi, 2001). It seems to be a very 
important area of further research to develop comparative price level data on a regional level in 
order to be able to derive true regional real wages.    10
We can also obtain a number of variables that describe important structural characteristics of the 
workforces in the repective sector/region-cells. In the shift-share analysis on employment growth 
we include the qualification structures and the structure of establishment sizes in each region, 
sector and time period. These exogenous variables are calculated as proportions of total employ-
ment in every cell with a lag of one year for the reference date of 30 June. We distinguish three 
skill categories (without formal vocational qualifications, completed apprenticeship, higher edu-
cation). People for whom no qualification details were available were added to the group without 
formal qualifications, as it is known that they correspond closest in their structure to this group. 
For establishment sizes, three categories were calculated: the proportion of firms with fewer than 
20 employees, those with 20-99 employees and those with at least 100 employees. The potential 
importance of firm sizes for the growth of the respective sector/region-cell, which might be used 
as a proxy for the degree of competition, has been emphasised e.g. by Porter (1990). In the pre-
ceding wage structure analysis we additionally control for the average age of the employees and 
for the fraction of men. 
Furthermore we not only distinguish all West German districts, but to capture differences in the 
development of broader classes of regions, and to filter out potential unobserved cost-of-living 
differentials, we additionally control for nine different area types according to the common clas-
sification scheme by the research unit of the German Federal Office for Building and Regional 
Planning (BBR, formerly BfLR; see Goermar/Irmen, 1991), which are listed in table 4. In the 
parentheses we report the number of districts in each area type class.  
 
Table 4: Type of district (within larger regions) according to BBR classification 
Regions with large  
agglomerations 
Regions with  
conurbational features 
Regions of rural  
character 
1 Core city (39)  5 Central city (21)   
2 Highly urbanised districts (41)     
3 Urbanised districts (29)  6 Urbanised districts (72)  8 Urbanised districts (44) 
4 Rural districts (10)  7 Rural districts (48)  9 Rural districts (22) 
 
 
3) Theoretical background 
In this section we present a stripped-down version of the macroeconomic model by Jer-
ger/Michaelis (2003). They use a modernized version of an approach inspired by Kaldor, where   11
different savings rates for workers and entrepreneurs in combination with price stickiness open 
the possibility of positive employment (growth) effects of wage increases.  
Suppose the economy is populated by a continuum of worker and entrepreneur households, in-
dexed by  [ ] 0,1 h∈  and [ ] 0,1 j∈ , who both live infinitely long. The utility function is homoge-
nous for members of the same, but heterogeneous across the two groups, and is defined over 



























= ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (2) 
    
This inclusion of money in the utility function in addition to the assumption of different time 
preference rates α and β for the two groups of households works as a convenient short-cut to al-
low for different exogenous savings rates across groups, and to abstract from investment as a 
source of aggregate demand.  
The Kaldorian structure of savings enters through the assumption that α > β, i.e. the worker 
households have a higher marginal propensity to consume (today).  Each worker household pos-
sesses initial money balances Mh,0 and earns an income Ih,e=(1-τ)W if employed and Ih,u=B if un-
employed, where W is a wage, B is a benefit and τ a proportional contribution rate to an unem-
ployment insurance system. Via the budget constraint of the unemployment insurance the aggre-
gate income of all worker households in period  t=1 is simply 
1
1, 1 , 0 0
W
hh I Id hW NM ≡= + ∫ , where 
N denotes the aggregate employment rate.  
Entrepreneur households own proportional shares of the capital stock and earn a residual income 
1
1, 1 , 0 0
E
j j I Id jP YW NM ≡= − + ∫ , where Y is aggregate real production. Assuming that the initial 
gross money stock  ,0 ,0 hj M MM ≡+ is distributed across the two groups according to 
,0 0 (1 )
W
h M I α =−  and  ,0 0 (1 )
E
j M I β =− , and taking into account that both types of households 
spend a constant fraction of their income for current consumption, aggregate demand at any point 
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The parameter mw can be interpreted as a payroll multiplier that depicts the positive effect on 
aggregate demand if there is a re-distribution from capital to labour income.
7  
The production side is characterised by a continuum of symmetrical, monopolistically competi-
tive firms that produce one differentiated variety each. The production function exhibits constant 
returns to scale. Moreover, we focus on the short run and assume that the capital stock is given. 
Marginal costs for the only variable input, labour, are increasing according to 
 
  ( )
1( 1 ) 11 (1 ) i cR W
σ σσ σσ γγ
− −− =− +  (4) 
 
where R is the rental rate of capital, σ is a technological and γ is a distribution parameter. Gross 
demand is split equally across all varieties and the price elasticity of demand is denoted –e (with 
e>1). The differentiation of single consumption varieties allows producers to charge prices with a 
mark-up (1/k) over marginal costs, with 0< ( ) 1 ke e ≡− <1. But, in accordance with Jer-
ger/Michaelis (2003), we assume that only a fraction (1-ς ) of all firms can adjust prices whereas 
the prices for the other firms are sticky. The aggregate price index P is given by 
 
  ()
1 () Pp c k
ς ς − =  (5) 
 
Log-linearizing (3)-(5) and the production function, we obtain the following growth rates of the 
endogenous variables (denoted by a tilde) 
 
  (1 ) PW ς γ =−      13
  ( ) w YN m k W N P γγ = =+ −      , 
 













  (6) 
Equation (6) entails the essential point of the short-run analysis by Jerger/Michaelis (2003): The 
employment growth effect of a wage increase ( 0 W >  ), which might occur because of a collective 
bargaining agreement, can be positive under certain circumstances. Since 01 W mk <<  the de-
nominator is always positive. With fully rigid prices (ς =1) a wage hike therefore unambiguously 
increases employment growth N  . The size of this effect increases with the payroll multiplier  W m  
and decreases with the mark-up 1/k. If prices are fully flexible (ς =0), the employment effect is 
always negative. In between the two extremes the effect can either be positive or negative, de-
pending on the sign of ( (1 ) W mk ς −− ). 
The analysis can be generalized also to the medium- and long-run where the capital stock can be 
adjusted. This puts additional strain on the potential validity of the PPA, which in the longer run 
can only hold under restrictive parameter constellations.  In particular this concerns the range of 
additional parameters like the scale elasticity or the cyclicality of the price mark-up, from which 
we have abstracted in our abbreviated model structure. Moreover, it must be noted that a closed-
economy setting was adopted. That is, an argument is neglected that is frequently raised against 
the PPA, namely that the induced demand side effects will partly drain out to other regions. This 
argument will be more relevant for export-oriented sectors with a low focus on the respective 
local market.  
  
4) Empirical approach 
We now turn to the specification of our shift-share regression approach. The unit of analysis is an 
industry within a region. The number of observations is thus i times larger than with a regional 
panel model with fixed industry effects and all estimations can be carried out with greater preci-
 
                                                 
7 Analogously, mM depicts a money multiplier. But since the nominal money stock M is assumed to remain constant, 
this variable will play no further role.   14
sion.
8 The basic model of the regression analogue of a shift-share approach by Patterson (1991) 
regresses the annual employment growth rate in sector i and district r on a complete set of sector, 
region and time dummies αi, κr and λt, and includes an error term εirt.  
 
  ˆ
irt i r t irt N α κλ ε =+++ (7) 
 
where  () (1 ) ˆ
irt ir t irt irt NN N N + =− .  
Since this method matches all requirements for standard statistical inference, we can include ad-
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with 
δy  the effect of area type y (y = 1...9), see table 4 
Qjir(t-1)   proportion of the qualification group j among all workers in cell [ir(t-1)]. 
Bzir(t-1)  proportion of the establishment size of category z among all workers in cell [ir(t-1)]. 
(1 ) rt W − ′   region fixed effect from the preceding wage structure analysis  
m X   interaction variable for sector m. Xm=1 if m=i, Xm=0 otherwise.  
β regression  coefficients 
 
The variable  (1 ) rt W − ′  is the (lagged) regional fixed effect for district r from the preceding wage 
structure analysis. To obtain this measure for “excessive” wages in region r, we estimate for each 
sector/region-combination and separately for each year 
 
                                                 
8 Blien et. al. (2003) also point to different methodological problems of panel models, in which the observation unit 
is a region. The authors show that the results of regional panel regressions are unstable and implausible especially 
with respect to the coefficients of the industries. An industry which is drastically shrinking may have a positive coef-
ficient. With regions as the observation units, two different effects can not be separated: one that is related to the 
development of the industry itself and one that is associated with the location of the industry. The shrinking industry 
may be associated with a positive development of the regions where it is located with high rates. A shift-share re-
gression approach is suited to precisely separate these effects.    15
0,
33
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The variables λ´t, α´i and δ´y denote the fixed time, sector and area type effects in this wage re-
gression. The qualification structure of the workforce and the structure of establishment sizes in 
each cell are also included in (8). But qualification and firm sizes supposedly influence not only 
employment growth, but also wages. The fraction of men is denoted Girt, Airt is the average age of 
the employees in cell [irt]. The error term of this equation is ε´irt. The variable  (1 ) rt W − ′ , the region 
fixed effect, can be understood as a measure that shows how wages in region r differ from what 
should be observed, given the variety of control variables. “High wage” and a “low wage” re-
gions are characterised by values of  (1 ) rt W − ′  that are significantly higher (lower) than zero. Note 
that the regressors  (1 ) rt W − ′  are unlikely to be biased through unobserved interregional price differ-
entials, since these are filtered out by the area type dummies δ´y. 
These region fixed effects, lagged by one period, are then used back in (8). As explained in the 
introduction, we use the regional fixed effects as our measure of “excessive” wages. Alterna-
tively one could use a fixed effect for each sector/region-combination in (9) to analyse how the 
wages in each cell differ from the level that should be expected. However, this approach would 
probably not allow to test the potential prevalence of the PPA, as the induced demand side reper-
cussions of a wage increase only in the own sector/region-combination supposedly will be very 
small. On the other hand, we abstract from interactions and demand spillovers across regions.
9 
Lastly, in the specification of the shift-share regression (8) we have included an interaction term 
X
m.  With this variable it is possible to analyse whether the effects of „excessive“ wages in region 
r differ systematically between the sectors in that district.  
Turning to the methodology, equation (8) must be estimated by using weighted least squares 
(WLS). Since the cells are very heterogeneous in their size, the same absolute change in em-
ployment implies very different changes in employment growth rates. Exorbitant jumps are pos-
sible in particular for very small cells, which results in an inherent heteroskedasticity problem. 
Therefore we weight the whole equation (8) with the employment of each cell (Nirt) divided by 
the total national employment (Nt) in the respective year. Technically speaking, we weight the   16
variance-covariance matrix of the error terms with a matrix G, which as a diagonal matrix in-











) cov( = ε = GΩG (10) 
 
For the wage equation (9), a comparable heteroskedasticiy problem does not arise, because we do 
not estimate a growth rate. Therefore we do not have to weight the observations.  
The second methodological problem is that the models (8) and (9) are plagued with perfect multi-
collinearity, because we use complete sets of dummy variables. The usual strategy is to exclude 
one fixed effect in each set of dummies. The other fixed effects are then measured in relation to 
this excluded reference category. However, in order to identify a “high wage” and a “low wage” 
region, we are interested in the deviation of a district r from the national grand mean. If this is to 
be used as the reference, one would have to recalculate not only the coefficients (like 
Krueger/Summers, 1988), but also their level of significance (Moeller, 1995). A comparatively 
more elegant solution is the use of identifying restrictions for the estimated coefficients. No fur-
ther recalculations for the parameters or for the standard errors are necessary with this procedure. 
The identifying restrictions are chosen such that the sum of the weighted coefficients must equal 
zero, so that we can interpret the estimated coefficients as percentage deviations from the national 
grand mean of zero. Since we need a time invariant weighting scheme for the definition of the 
constraints, we use the employment proportions for the year 1997 (the middle of the observation 
period). Note that the specification of the constraints is simply a normalization for one set of 
dummy variables that does not affect the other estimated coefficients.  









⋅ = ∑   ,  (11) 
 
 
                                                 
9 This corresponds with the closed economy setting from the theoretical model introduced in section 3. The issue of 
regional demand spillovers is potentially interesting and could, in later papers, be analysed with spatial econometrics 
techniques.   17
where gi is the employment share of sector i in 1997 and  i a   is the dummy variable of sector i that 
is weighted according to (10). Analogously, we restrict the coefficients for the three skill catego-





















⋅ = ∑   (13) 
 
where gj and gz are the respective employment shares in 1997 and the tilde indicates the weight-
ing of the coefficients according to (10). For the district fixed effects  r κ   and the area type fixed 









= ∑∑   (14) 
 
where τy = 1 if district r belong to area type y, and τy = 0 otherwise. And additionally we centre 









= ∑   (15) 
 
The estimated district coefficients  r W′, weighted by the employment proportion gr=Nrt/Nt 
(t=1997), therefore sum up to zero not only for all 326 districts, but also for all districts of area 
type y. We can thus interpret the coefficients  r κ   as percentage deviations from the mean growth 
rate in the respective area type y, and the coefficients  y δ   as percentage deviations of area type y 
from the West German average. Analogous restrictions are imposed for the preceding wage re-
gression (8), only without the weighting procedure (10).  
The selected econometric procedure, the constrained estimation of (9) and (8), leads to a re-
stricted weighted least squares estimate of a regression model without an intercept (see also   18
Greene/Seaks, 1991). For some of the determinants of employment growth it might be argued 
that there is an endogeneity problem. For example, a better qualification structure in some region 
r might be - at least partly - the result of a better employment growth and not its cause, since the 
more active regions might attract selective mobility. Similarly, one could also argue that there 
might be an endogeneity problem between employment growth and wages, as employment 
growth might drive wages rather than the opposite.
10 These problems are taken into account by 
using the exogenous variables with a time lag of one period. For the impact of wages, equations 
(8) and (9) implicitly define a recursive system  (1 ) ˆ (, ) irt r t Nf WZ − ′ =  and  ˆ (, ) rt irt Wf N Z ′ = , where Z 
represent the other exogenous variables. The causality in this system is  (1 ) ˆ
rt i r t r t WN W − ′ ′ ⎯⎯ →⎯ ⎯ →  
and there is no endogeneity probloem. To be completely sure, tests with higher time lags were 
carried out, which showed no substantial change in the results.  
 
5) The wage structure in West Germany 
Although the purpose to estimate (9) is only to obtain the district fixed effects as regressors for 
the employment growth analysis, some results of the wage structure regression are of independ-
ent interest and we present them briefly at this point.
11 Equation (9) is estimated separately for 
each year and entails four broad classes of explanatory variables: (i) the variables Qjirt, Bjirt, Girt 
and Airt that describe important structural characteristics of the workforces in the sector/region-
cells; (ii) the nine area type dummies δ´yt; (ii) the 28 sector dummies a´it; and (iv) the 326 district 
dummies W´rt. For expositional purposes, we only report some results of a pooled regression over 
the whole observation period with additional time dummies for each year. Since we estimate sub-
ject to identifying restrictions, the standard R
2 measure is not available. When running an OLS 
regression that is as close as possible to our actual estimation strategy (i.e. by dropping one 
dummy variable from each set of fixed effects) we obtain R
2 levels above 0.9.  
Table 5 shows the results for the first group of variables. Average wages increase with the aver-
age age, with the proportion of qualified workers, the fraction of large firms and the fraction of 
men. All variables are significant at the 1%-level. An inspection of the time dimension shows that 
the effects are roughly stable over time, with a slightly increasing tendency of the skill premium.  
                                                 
10 This mechanism is at the core of the „wage setting curves“ in the modern imperfect competition approach of mac-
roeconomics (see Layard/Nickell/Jackman, 1991).  
11 If the disaggregated wage structure were the main research focus, one would typically want to work with individ-
ual instead of aggregated data, even though our disaggregation is considerably deep.    19
Table 5: Wage analysis - Regression results I: Structural variables 
  Variable  Coefficient 
1
Q β′   Low qualification  -0.2125 
2
Q β′  
Medium  
qualification  0.0131 
3
Q β′   High qualification  0.5477 
1
B β′   Firm size 1-19  -0.1570 
2
B β′   Firm size 20-99  0.0181 
3
B β′   Firm size > 100  0.0730 
G β′   Fraction of men  0.4307 
A β′   Average age  0.0086 
0 β   constant term  4.4497 
 
Table 6 reports the results for the area type fixed effects, which again are all significant at the 
1%-level. We clearly find evidence for an agglomeration wage premium in West Germany (see 
also Moeller/Haas, 2003). Core cities and directly surrounding districts pay about 2.5-3 percent 
above average. A closer look at the time dimension shows that this wage premium tends to be 
rising over time. For 1993, the estimated coefficient for area type 1 is 0.0267, in 2001 it is 0.032. 
The most rural districts (area type 9) pay more than 7 per cent below average. One must note, 
however, that these wage differences between centre and periphery probably also reflect interre-
gional price differentials that we can not control for.  
 
Table 6: Wage analysis - Regression results II: Area types 
  Variable  Coefficient 
1 δ′  Agglomeration region - Core city  0.0295 
2 δ′   Agglomeration region – Highly urbanised distr. 0.0241 
3 δ′   Agglomeration region - Urbanised districts  -0.0068 
4 δ′   Agglomeration region - Rural districts  -0.0276 
5 δ′   Conurbational region - Central city  -0.0126 
6 δ′   Conurbational region - Urbanised district  -0.0179 
7 δ′   Conurbational region - Rural district  -0.0401 
8 δ′   Rural region - Urbanised district  -0.0520 
9 δ′   Rural region - Rural district  -0.0752 
   20
With respect to the sector dummies, that we do not report here, our results support commonly 
held beliefs about sectoral wage differences. For example, the financial sector pays more than 23 
percent above average even after controlling for the characteristics reported in table 5. Other well 
paying sectors are electronics and health care. The agricultural sector, household related services 
and in particular the gastronomy sector pay very badly.  
Lastly, there are the 326 district fixed effects that are presented in form of a map.
12 The district 
dummy of areas shaded in light grey is significantly positive, i.e. earnings in these districts are 
overly high according to our definition. The dark shaded districts are “low wage regions”. Proba-
bly the most striking feature of map 1 is that low-, medium- and high-wage areas are not distrib-
uted randomly across space, but there seems to be a coherent spatial structure, namely a cluster-
ing of high-wage and low-wage areas. This is even more striking as the district fixed effects are 
calculated with the average wage of the respective area type as the reference category. Since we 
have controlled for the area types, the district effects isolate genuine location factors and do not 
represent the well-known fact that agglomeration areas pay a wage premium (a fact that can be 
read in table 6). The map suggests that districts surrounding Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt and 
Hamburg pay significantly above the average of their respective area type. The origin of this 
wage premium can not be resolved with our data, since it prevails even after controlling for a 
variety of factors. We interpret this unexplained rest as a measure of “excessively” high wages in 
these districts. 
By and large, the wage level in most Southern districts is significantly above average even after 
controlling for many structural characteristics. But the division scheme is more complex. Firstly, 
there are at least some “high wage islands” in the North, e.g. the area surrounding Hamburg and 
the districts around the Volkswagen headquarters in Wolfsburg. Secondly, not all Southern dis-
tricts pay overly well. The most striking cases are the districts in northern and eastern Bavaria, 
which actually tend to be low-wage regions. Apart from the north-south-divides, it is striking that 
border regions mostly tend to be low-wage regions, including the former border with East Ger-
many, but excluding the borders with Austria and Switzerland. Most of these borders no longer 
have any formal significance as obstacles for trade or factor mobility. This is obviously so in the 
case of the former intra-German border, which simply does not exist any longer. But, to a lesser 
extent, the borders with other EU countries also have lost legal importance. Some authors have 
                                                 
12 A full list of the estimated coefficients (and their significance) for all 326 districts and separately for each year is 
available upon request from the corresponding author.   21
argued that formally insignificant borders can remain important as actual separation lines for 
trade and mobility (Head/Ries, 2001; Head/Mayer, 2000). Brakman/Garretsen/Schramm (2002) 
point out that one can analyse border effects also by looking at regional wage data. Our results 
suggest that the border effect issue for West Germany is actually quite complex. Some borders do 
not seem to have any negative impact on the adjacent regions, although (as in the case of the 
Swiss border) they keep on being formally significant. Other, formally insignificant or non-














 Wage structure - district fixed effects
mean: -0.006
standard deviation: 0.034
positiv coeffizients with P- Value <= 0.10 (103 districts)
coeffizients with P- Value >0.10 (91 districts)
negativ coeffizients with P- Value <= 0.10 (169 districts)
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6) Employment growth in West Germany 
We now go over to the results of the shift-share regression on employment growth, which is es-
timated pooled over the whole observation period. Table 7 reports the regression results for the 
first group of explanatory variables. We do not yet differentiate the impact of regional wages on 
the employment growth of different sectors (i.e. we do not estimate with the interaction term X
m). 
This will be done below in table 8. The numbers in parentheses report the P-value of the estimate. 
 
Table 7: Employment growth regression – Results I: Structural variables 
  Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
1





























r W′    Wages ---  -0.0859 
(0.000) 
 
A high fraction of well qualified workers significantly increases the employment growth of a 
sector/region-cell. Holding constant all other factors, including wages, more qualified workers 
raise the productivity in the respective cell, which invokes a positive employment effect. A sig-
nificantly positive effect on employment growth also is also found for a high proportion of me-
dium sized firms, whereas a high fraction of large firms tends to reduce employment growth. As 
long as firm sizes can be used as a proxy for the degree of competition that prevails in the respec-
tive sector and region (see Combes, 2000 for some critical remarks on this), our findings suggest 
that neither perfect competition (very small firms), nor local monopoly (very large firms) is the 
most growth friendly environment. Rather, a large fraction of firms with an intermediate firm 
scale seems to be best for growth. This finding contradicts the view that favours local monopoly 
as a growth engine, on the grounds that a monopolist can better internalise the profits from inno-
vations and subsequently reinvest in further R&D (see Glaeser et.al., 1992 for an introduction). It 
also stands in some contrast to the reasoning of Porter (1990), according to which perfect compe-  23
tition is best for growth, since firms without market power face the stiffest pressure to be innova-
tive in order to survive in the market. Our results suggest that the advantages and disadvantages 
of perfect competition and monopoly for innovation and growth at the regional level seem to be 
balanced in an optimal way by medium-sized firms.  
 
Wages 
We now look at the employment growth effects of high wages. Recall that we have conceptual-
ised the notion of high, or “excessive”, wages by the respective regional fixed effect from the 
wage structure analysis. An increase in this measure can be interpreted as an exogenous positive 
wage shock that accrues uniformly across all sectors in that district. What are the employment 
growth effects for the single involved sectors? According to the theoretical considerations from 
section 3 we must separate two effects: A cost push for the input factor labour, and a demand side 
effect due to an increase of the regional purchasing power.  
The result from table 7 suggests that with all sectors lumped together the consolidated impact of a 
wage hike on employment growth is significantly negative. An increase of the district fixed effect 
(1 ) rt W − ′  (a regional wage hike) of ten percentage points that is not backed by the underlying char-
acteristics of the economy, drives down annual employment growth by more than 0.85 per cent. 
Qualitatively we can interpret this finding such that the cost push effect dominates on balance 
over possible demand side repercussions in West Germany. This result is consistent with the 
theoretical implications of the standard macroeconomics literature, according to which high wage 
will reduce employment (growth). It stands in contrast with the view that higher wages are an 
appropriate way to increase economic activity (or: to fight unemployment) via a purchasing 
power effect of wages. One main contribution of our study is to show that this intuitive result, 
which is in accordance with the standard predictions of mainstream economics, can also be iden-
tified when a highly disaggregated view is adopted.  
It is worth to point to a pitfall when the wage enters the shift-share regression in an incorrectly 
specified way. We re-estimated model 2, but replaced the (correct) wage measure  (1 ) rt W − ′  with the 
unsettled average regional wage, and in another version with the unsettled average wage of the 
respective sector/region-cell. In both cases we obtain a highly significant (1%-level), small, but 
positive coefficient (0.002694 and 0.000078 respectively). But this finding does not imply that 
high wages really contribute to faster employment growth, as one could naively (or purposely)   24
conclude. The positive estimated coefficients only indicate that high productivity (i.e. high 
wages) and fast employment growth tend to be positively correlated in West Germany. Let us 
illustrate this with an example: Both the unsettled average wage and the average annual employ-
ment growth rate in the Bavarian district Dingolfing-Landau, where the local employment struc-
ture is dominated by a large automobile plant, are significantly above the West German average. 
However, the high wage level in this district can be well explained by the qualification of the 
local workforce, the firm size and the industrial structure, etc., and the respective district fixed 
effect in the wage structure analysis is insignificant. This indicates that wages in Dingolfing-
Landau are not overly high, which is taken into account by our estimation approach. On the con-
trary, including unsettled wages, without controlling for these normal wage discrepancies across 
sectors and regions, leads to flawed conclusions with respect to the implications for employment 
growth. 
Going back to the correctly specified wage measure, the disaggregated structure of the empirical 
model allows us to examine if the relative strength of the cost push and the purchasing power 
effect of wages differs across sectors. Is the PPA maybe valid at least for some sectors? In table 8 
we present the results for an estimation variant with the sectoral interaction term X
m. That is, we 
differentiate the implications of a proportional regional wage increase on the employment growth 
performance across the single industries. The cost push effect hurts all involved industries to the 
extent that they use labour in production. But the purchasing power effect might be stronger for 
sectors that mainly serve local consumers than for export oriented sectors.  
The overall picture remains that “excessive” wages tend to reduce employment growth. But there 
is considerable variation across the single industries. The wage impact is significantly negative in 
the mining sector (which is not too important due to its small size), in the chemical and synthetic 
material industry, in the processing industries (leather, food), in transportation, but also in the 
“key sectors” automobile production, construction, commerce and information technology, which 
are among the largest sectors in West Germany. Also for health care and social services we find a 
significantly negative impact on employment growth. 
For some sectors, however, the impact of higher wages is insignificant. This is the case for most 
service industries, including the advanced services like education, financial business and the 
economy-related services, but also for the more basic household-related services and gastronomy. 
But also in some manufacturing sectors, namely in the electronics sector, machinery, metal 
manufacturing and the glass/ceramics sector, and in some processing industries (wood, paper,   25
jewellery) the estimated coefficients are insignificant. A plausible hypothesis, presumably rele-
vant for the gastronomy, leisure-related services etc., seems to be that these sectors have a 
stronger focus on local markets. Hence, these sectors are stronger affected from potential demand 
side repercussions of local wage hikes. A different argument is that the wage elasticity of labour 
demand is generally lower in some sectors, e.g. because payroll accounts for a smaller fraction in 
total costs. This might explain some of the insignificant coefficients particularly in industrial sec-
tors.   
 
Table 8: Regression results II – Wage growth and employment growth across sectors 
   Sector  Coefficient  P-Value 
1  Agriculture & Forestry  -0.4245 0.143 
2  Utilities & Electric Industry  -0.1390 0.254 
3 Mining  -0.3355 0.039 
4 Chemical  Industry  -0.3788 0.000 
5 Synthetic  Material  -0.2182 0.050 
6 Nonmetallic  Mineral  Mining  -0.3319 0.188 
7 Glass  &  Ceramics  0.3757 0.137 
8 Primary  Metal  Manuf.  0.0210 0.711 
9 Machinery  0.0353 0.536 
10 Motor  Vehicles  -0.1432 0.001 
11  Office Supplies, IT & Optics  -0.1102 0.007 
12  Musical Instrum., Jewellery, Toys  -0.3366 0.391 
13 Wood-working    0.0060 0.957 
14  Paper & Printing  -0.0612 0.562 
15 Leather  &  Apparel  -0.2129 0.061 
16 Food  &  Tobacco  -0.2675 0.001 
17 Building  &  Construction  -0.2274 0.000 
18  Commerce  -0.0925 0.011 
19  Information & Transportation  -0.2529 0.000 
20  Finance & Insurance  0.0272 0.538 
21  Hotels & Gastronomy  -0.0038 0.961 
22  Health Care & Social Assistance  -0.0723 0.083 
23 Economy-Related  Services  -0.0220 0.550 
24 Education  -0.0903 0.209 
25 Leisure-Related  Services  0.0042 0.966 
26 Household-Related  Services  0.0254 0.919 
27 Social  Services  -0.1625 0.030 
28 Public  Sector  0.0916 0.055 
 
The sectoral variation notwithstanding, we do not find support for the view that it is actually pos-
sible to increase the growth of private employment by accelerating wage growth. By and large 
the wage effects tend to be more adverse in manufacturing than in services. But even for those   26
sectors that are closest to local consumers, a significantly positive employment growth effect can 
not be identified in the data. This result is again reassuring a predominant neoclassical view. But 
we are unaware of other studies where this result has been established clearly.  
 
Fixed effects 
Apart from the results on the effects of high wages, we obtain some further, more general insights 
about the disaggregated anatomy of employment growth in West Germany. We look first at the 
estimation results for the industry fixed effects that are reported in table 9. These coefficients 
describe the general sector-specific growth pattern over the observation period and reveal a quite 
clear trend of structural change, away from manufacturing activities and towards services. This 
process went on both for services jobs with a rather bad reputation (gastronomy, household-
related), but also for higher quality jobs like in financial services or education. The only manufac-
turing sector with a significantly higher growth rate than the average is automobile production. 
The long-term process of structural change is documented at various points in the literature (e.g. 
Madison, 1987), and it shows up also in our estimation results even though the observation period 
is relatively short to address the issue of structural change.   
 
Table 9: Regression results IV – Industry fixed effects 
   Variable  Model 1  Model 2 








































11 α    Office Supplies, IT, Optics  -0.0018 
(0.066) 
-0.0016 
(0.112)   27
   Variable  Model 1  Model 2 





































































In table 10 we report the results for the area type dummies. The most interesting finding here is 
that large city districts (area types 1 and 5) tend to lose employment slowly but significantly. This 
“sub-urbanization” process – just like the structural change process – is also a long-term devel-
opment that implies a structural de-glomeration process of employment away from the core city 
centres. Similar findings have been pointed out in earlier studies for West Germany e.g. by Seitz 
(1996) or Geppert (1996). In accordance with Moeller/Tassinopoulos (2000) we find that the em-
ployment gainers are not only the areas that are directly adjacent to the biggest cities (area types 
2+3), but also other regional types.  
The time period dummies  1994 2001 λ λ −   that describe general business cycle movements are omit-
ted, since they are of minor interest for us. We also omit the remaining district fixed effects, as   28
they turn out to be very small and in the vast majority insignificant.
13 This suggests that most 
locations do not grow at systematically different rates after controlling for the variety of struc-
tural characteristics that we have accounted for.  
 
Table 10: Regression results III – Area type fixed effects 
   Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
1 δ  






2 δ  
Agglomeration region -  





3 δ  
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7) Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper we have analysed the intra-national variation of employment growth in West Ger-
many from 1993 to 2001 with a newly developed shift-share regression technique. We have spe-
cifically addressed the question whether high wages tend to increase or reduce employment 
growth on a local level. Our analysis profited from an exhaustive and very accurate data set with 
the complete sample of full time employment subject to social security in West Germany, disag-
gregated into 28 industries and 326 districts.  
To obtain an accurate measure for “excessive” regional wages we ran a preceding wage structure 
analysis and isolated the unexplained regional fixed effects as regressors for the employment 
growth analysis. Some of the results of this preceding analysis are of independent interest. We 
have shown that there is a coherent spatial wage structure in West Germany. One can observe a 
regional clustering of high- and low-wage regions. This distinct geographical distribution features 
                                                 
13 A list with the coefficients is also available upon request from the corresponding author.    29
a south-north incline of wages, but with high wage islands in the North, and low-wage islands in 
the South. Moreover we find that wages of border districts seem to be systematically lower than 
the average, including districts along the former intra-German border, but excluding border re-
gions with Austria and Switzerland. Agglomeration areas pay a notable wage premium that is 
even rising over time.  
The subsequent shift-share regression on employment growth shows that the impact of “exces-
sive” regional wages on employment growth is significantly negative. We find no evidence for 
the claim (that is often raised in policy discussions prior to wage negotiations) that it is possible 
to increase employment growth by accelerating wage growth via a demand side purchasing 
power effect of wages. By differentiating the effect of wages on employment growth across sec-
tors we find some variation across industries. The effect of a wage hike turns out to be highly 
significant in some industries, insignificant in others. The general pattern seems to be that the 
employment effects are more adverse in manufacturing than in service industries that presumably 
have a stronger focus to serve local consumers. But we find no evidence for a positive effect of a 
high wages on employment growth. Further case studies would be useful that examine the rea-
sons for this variation across sectors in greater detail.  
Apart from the special focus on wages our shift-share regression also yields some more general 
insights about the disaggregated anatomy of employment growth in West Germany. We identi-
fied two long-term processes in the development, namely a secular trend of structural change 
towards service industries and a sub-urbanization process.  
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